I am a writer and philosopher from the Netherlands. Recently, I finished my PhD at King's College London and the University of Chicago (the latter as a visiting student). Aside from philosophy, I write prose poems and literary essays.
My philosophical research is about rational agency, or the question: what sort of rational control do we exercise over our acts (the things that we do, in a broad sense that includes believing, desiring, perceiving)? I am also interested in skepticism and the everyday, and the relation between philosophy and literature.
Here is my curriculum vitae.
Abstract It is commonly held that both understanding and sense perception are passive in a way that contrasts with the activity of judgement. I argue that this is mistaken. On my view, to have a proposition in mind is normally already to believe it; to be under an appearance is normally already to take things to be so; it is the suspension of judgement that is logically more complex. I develop this view in dialogue with the works of Charles Travis and John McDowell, and trace the issue back to Descartes and Spinoza, Frege and Wittgenstein. (academia.edu)
Abstract In this short essay, I develop what I take to be the deepest reason that Charles Travis has for criticising John McDowell's views of perception. Although since writing this essay, now almost a year ago, I have come to reject the main underlying assumption, I still think it is valuable as a concise articulation of a resistance to "conceptualism" in the philosophy of perception. Because of this, and also because Travis cites a passage from this paper in his "The Move, the Divide, the Myth, and its Dogma", I think that it is helpful to have it available. (academia.edu)
Abstract Did the later Wittgenstein offer a theory of meaning? This may seem to be incompatible with Wittgenstein's resistance to theses in philosophy. At best it would consist of a series of truisms: “If someone were to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them.” (PI 128) But Schneider argues that Wittgenstein's anti-theoretic remarks should be taken with a grain of salt: there is something like a theory of meaning to be found in Wittgenstein's later work. (pdf)
See also my academia.edu page.